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There has been a fundamental change in the character of congressional
elections in the past twenty years. The number of congressional elections
won by greater than 55 percent of the vote has increased greatly. ' One explanation for the increased number of safe seats has stressed effective incumbent use of staff, free trips to the district and other advantages of their
office. Thi s research will test the hypothesis that U.S. House incumbents
have been able to create safe seats by using the perquisites of a congresional offi ce.

Literature
Fiorina vividly describes the creation of a safe congressional district.
He examines two traditionally marginal districts of which one became safe
in I 964. 2 The behavior of legislators in these two districts is revealing; the
legislator from the district that remained marginal devoted much time to
policy affairs in Washington while the member in the safe district concentrated on consitutent affairs. The safe legislator established a personal
presence in the district by moving among gatherings during frequent trips
home. He used the advantages of th~ office, Washington and district staff,
and maintained three field offices. Fiorina concludes that the safe district
resulted from the deemphasis of controversial policy positions and the " ...
emphasis of nonpartisan, nonprogrammatic constituency service. " 1 Other
research supports Fiorina's conclusions. Born, for example, also believes
that the rise in incumbent safety has resulted from freshmen elected since
1966obtaining greater electoral rewards from their first term. Born suggests
that new members " ... induced voting shifts in their favor by effectively
capitalizing on the opportunities of incumbencies.',.
The 11,ssons of Fiorina's tale have not been _overlooked by congressmen. Newer and more marginal members especially are using the opportunities provided by a congressional office to enhance constituency service and contact. Cover' notes that more narrowly elected members take full
advantage of the franking privilege and have a higher monthly mailing rate
than other members. All members, especially the most recently elected,
have been aided by increased free trips home and are returning to the
district more frequently. 6 In spite of this evidence, there is little research
that links the use of the opportunities of a congressional office to increased
vote for incumbents.
One source of data that has been used to research such a link is the SRC
national election studies . Since 1978 these studies have identified methods
by which voters have been contacted by congressional candidates. Using
these data Mann and Wolfinger find that the use of constituent-service ac31

tivities has resulted in the incumbent being better known in the distr"
also being confronted
by relatively less well-know n challeict Ind
Abramowitz finds that contacts with constituents have produced favnger
s.'
evaluations of the incumbent which may be of electoral benefit. • Jacorabl
e
~uggests tha~ inc~m~ents benefit from various activities including ad~~~n
mg and credit cla1mmg, and that these advantages accrue pr ior to the r 1stion campaign. 9
eccc.
. Thes: studies ~~e enlighteni~g but their con~lusions must be consider
with caution . Leg1t1mate questions may be raised conce rn ing the ca Cd
direction of the relationship between contacts and can dida te evaluat~sal
Dexter, for example, notes that legislators are more likely to be conta~~
by constituents that agree with them. ' 0 The SRC findings may be les
product of contacts enhancing candidate evaluation an d mor e a resui/ a
those favoring the legislator not being passive recipients but instead activ ~r
seeking such contacts. Also, the small N of the SRC stu dies may prod : Y
uncertain findings. The 1978 SRC survey sampled only about
respondents in a district and not all of these had cont act with the incum.
bent. Clearly, another approach would be valuable in p roviding both a
unique perspective of the relationship between the use of a congressional of.
fice and vote and perhaps to bolster the SRC findings.
Unfortunately, there have been few attempts to specify a direct link
between use of a congressional office and vote for incumbents. Brown
Fuchs, and Hoadley's analysis of a subset of House De mo crats from th;
class of 1974 discovered that variables such as staffing, tri ps to the district
and phone calls were unrelated to reelection success. 11 The only substantial
predictor of incumbent vote was campaign spending . Johannes and
McAdams found that casework, as determined by staff esti mates of the
number of cases and projects processed in a legislator's office, had no
statistically significant impact upon vote for incumbents in the 1978congressional elections . 12 Born did not find an impact of sta ffi ng on vote for
House incumbents . 13
One explanation for the failure of these studies to find a relationship
between perquisite use and incumbent vote is that they studied both
marginal and non-marginal districts. It is plausible that the impact of perquisite use on vote for incumbents would be most effecti ve in marginal
districts . While perquisites may be responsible for transfor ming a marginal
into a safe district, there is no reason to believe that this relat ionship is continuous in producing even safer districts. As shown in Fig ur e 1, it is in the
marginal districts (shaded area) that perquisite use may affect vote and it is
here that efforts to measure this relationship should be directed .
There are several possible reasons that perquisite use will not increase
vote percent once a district has become safe. The first reaso n relates to the
electoral nature of a district. There are likely to be limits beyond which a
legislator's share of the vote cannot be increased no matter what the levelof
perquisite use . There are always some voters, for example strong identifiers
of the challenger's party, who would not vote for the inc umb ent under any
conditions. Alford and Hibbing provide support for this by demonstrati ng
that, after an initial rapid growth, incumbent vote ten ds to sta bili ze at about
67 percent.,.
The changing goals of congressmen may affect the relationship between perquisite use and incumbent vote. As members beco me safe they are
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likelyto continue using the advantages of their offices, but the focus of this
use will shift from primarily electoral to other goals. Hibbing notes that
congressmentire of constant campaigning while neglecting their families. 15
Safe legislators are therefore likely to enjoy their security and use trips
homeand days in the district for family rather than political reasons. Fenno
notes that the district political activities members do engage in will be
devoted to protecting the existing electoral base rather than expansion. 16
During this 'protectionist' stage of their career " ...
House members
become less interested in building supportive constituencies and most concerned about keeping electoral support already attained."" Also, electorally
secure members may become more involved with their policy interests and
reassign staff from political to legislative duties. Fenno found that safe
legislators tend to pursue other goals such as policy or influence in the
House.11 Safe legislators continue to use the advantages of their office but
this use may be directed toward different goals and may confound the
relationship between perquisites and incumbent vote.

Research Design
To measure the impact of perquisite use on incumbent vote we examined
a large number of cases over several elections in the most marginal districts
in Congress. The districts studied were selected by analyzing vote returns in
House districts for the five elections from 1960 through 1968. To be
selected, a district's average Democratic vote for the five elections could
vary only between 40 and 60 percent with no district in any one year fluctuating outside of the 35 to 65 percent range. 19 Using this rule we were able
to select 86 districts which were the most marginal in Congress from 1960
through 1968.20 Having determined the districts with a historical record of
marginality we then analyzed the relationship between constituency-service
variables on incumbent vote in elections from 1972 through 1978.21 If there
is a relationship between constituency service and vote for incumbent, it
should be visible in these previously marginal districts.
The dependent variable is incumbents' share of the two-party vote.
33

There are two categories of ind~pendent variables. The first mea sures th
ability of perquisites to affect vote. The second category consists of n e
perquisite variables that may also affect incumbents vote; these are inclu~~
to more completely specify the model.
e

Perquisite Independent Variables
There are two means by which the advantages of a congress ional offi
enable a legislator to curry favor with constituents. First, the advantagce
enhance the ability of a legislator to personally pay attentio n to the distric~s
Second, the perquisites provide surrogates for the legislator, in the form of
staff, who provide various services for constituents. Both personal and surrogate attention may be effective in increasing support amo ng con stituents
and it is necessary to include both types of variables in the mod el.
An important perquisite that legislators receive is free trips to the
district. These trips help the incumbent give personal attention to district af.
fairs. The first independent variable, therefore, is the num ber of trips the
incumbent takes to the district. This variable is somewhat incomplete as it
does not indicate how long the incumbent remained in the district. The
longer the legislator is in the district the more time that is ava ilable for
building support with constituents. Length of stay, therefore , may be important in explaining incumbent vote and was included as an independent
variable.
The number of trips and days were relatively easy to com pu te when
round-trip vouchers were filed with the Clerk of the House. 22 When oneway vouchers were filed we credited the incumbent with one tri p and one
day spent in the district since no assumption about the lengt h of the visit
could be made . Those members who received a yearly lump-sum reimbur sement for their trips were excluded from the analysis since it was impossible
to determine either the number of days or trips. 23
The second group of perquisites that may affect vote are staff.
Through casework, staff are in contact with thousands of constit uent s and
have the potential for a substantial impact on vote. The meas ure s of this
perquisite are the number of (1) Washington staff (2) district staff
(3) district offices. 2 • Each of these measures, in different ways, ma y affect
constituents' vote decisions . Washington staff resolve constituent problems
with the federal bureaucracy. District staff interact with cons tituents and
serve as a link with Washington. District offices are a sym bol of the
members' presence in the district and provide access to staff.2 5 Each
legislator will emphasize different elements of these three staff measures. It
is necessary, therefore, to include all three measures in the model.

Non-Perquisite Independent Variables
The second category of independent variables more fully specifies the
model of incumbent vote. The first variable in this category is expected
district vote. Most incumbents quickly establish a base of support con sisting
of those voters committed to the candidate. 2 6 The use of perq uisites is not
intended to fully explain all of the incumbents' vote but only that increment
above the base. For each election the base was calculated as the incumbent
party's average vote for the previous five elections.
The srrength of the challenger is an important factor that affects vote
for the incumbent. There exists a strong negative relationship betwe en the
34

vel of cha llenger spending and incumbent vote. 21 Given this relationship,
1 measure of challenger strength will be challenger spending. Since
;e
hallenger spending has a constantly diminishing effect on incumbent vote,
~hisvaria~ le was used in a natural logarithmic form to properly specify this
relationship .

Analysis

At the outset, it is important to note that use of
becoming increasingly popular in Congress. In Table
the members of our 86 districts have increased the use
J968 to 1976. These congressmen must feel that there
use of the advantages of their office.

the district service is
1 it can be seen that
of the activities from
is some utility in the

TABLE I
increase of Congressional EntrepreneurialAcdvlties
- Mran Uvels of At1lvl1ies by Year For
District s (N = 86)1976

1968

1970

1972

1974

12.4

21.9

34.8

36.8

46.2

80.0

128.9

183.0

192.0

166.7

umber of Staff In Washington Office

6.2

6.6

7.0

7,9

8.7

umberof Staff In District Office

2.2

2.6

2.8

3.9

5. 1

1.3

1.4

1.4

1.9

2. 1

umberof Tr ips To Dis1rict

Oa)'SSpent in District

Numberof Ois1ric1 Offices

Ordinary least-squares was used to estimate the effect of the independent varia ble s on the dependent variable. 28 While challenger spending did
affect vote, there is no consistent relationship between the district-service
variables an d vote for the incumbent. Born and Alford and Hibbing suggest
that the major increase in support for incumbents occurs during the first
several reelec tions. 29 •30 With this in mind we reestimated the model using
only the first and second reelection contests. This model also failed to exhibit a relationship. We must conclude that, at least in this study, that district
attention does not have an independent effect on incumbent vote.
TABLE 2
OLS EstimattS of Co nsti1ut:ncy Modd
Dtptndent V1ri1blt- lnc::
umbenl / Vote/ Ptrctnl

Intercept

District A vcragc
ChallengerSpending
(Thousands of Dollar s)

Trips Home
Days in District

1972

1974

1976

1978

652.955•
(168,914)

599.702°
(121.994)

687.3!0 '
(82,879)

477,618'
(99.541)

- .0627
(.0264)
- 1.622'
(.4174)
- 2. 144
(2.818)
-, )107
(.2989)

. 1209
(. 1663)

- 1.360'
(.2507)

- .5932'
(.2117)

-. 2092
(. 1419)

- .0289
(.2062)

2,827
(5.052)

District Offices

24.31
(23.36)

12.85
(16.39)

.27
3.66•

' p .05
Standard Errors in Parenthesis
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- 3.986 '
(. ) 197)
1.497
(I.I 17)

2.679
(9,890)

4.042
(9,654)

- 1.027'
(. 1563)
1.124
(.7798)

12. 14
(I 1.89)

R'
F Value

, )487
(. 1594)

.9527
(1.428)

District Staff

Washington Staff

- .227)
(. 1338)

- 2.501
(5.871)

- 3.054
(10. 12)

- 3. 188
(11.69)

8.700
(6.437)

15.09 '
(4,408)

7.340
(5,369)

.49
7.78•

,48
7.64'

.36
4.97'

Conclusion
As did Johannes and McAdams we find no direct empirical evidence f
any relationship between constituent service and House incumbents' el0
toral success even in districts with a history of margin ality . 11 We :·
reasonably certain that this finding is not an artifact of distorte d data. It .e
logical to expect the Clerk data to be fairly accurate. Since these data ~ s
generated from expense vouchers submitted by legislators for reimburs e
ment, few would fail to apply for expenses incurred as part of their jo~Even if random error existed, we could not expect this to totally negate a rela~
tionship between constituent service and vote. Moreover, the staffing data
are highly accurate and also failed to demonstrate a relati onship between
district attentiveness and vote. 32
While we find no meaningful effects, the possibility of a long-tenn
payoff from constituency service remains. Perhaps more detailed models of
the relationship between constituency service and incumbent vote need to be
developed and tested. Fiorina supports this position and argues that the
service-vote relationship is complex and non-recursive. 33 In their "Reply"
to Fiorina's comments, however, McAdams and Johannes indicated that
they " .. . made every reasonable effort to test for interactions and alternative functional forms" and still did not find a relationship between attention and vote. 34 We tested more complex models with additi onal controls
and lagged variables and did not detect an impact of attention on vote. 31
Further research should not only investigate simultane ous effects but
should also be sensitive to alternative explanations. For example, constituents may expect a certain level of attentiveness. 36 Incumbents may be
susceptible to a blackmail effect, as increased district attentive ness raises
constituency expectations. Attentiveness above some undete rmined level
may not increase incumbent electoral margins, but incumbents may be
punished electorally for dropping below district expectations over an extended period of time. Thus incumbents who create a home style based on
district attentiveness may find their constituents expect it to continue and
are displeased if it does not. However, researchers may need to design more
sensitive measures of incumbent safety. District attentiveness , casework,
and incumbent contacts may only affect a small, yet important, percentage
of the vote. Perhaps if we knew how much of the congressional vote could
be attributed to local forces the direct effects of these variables would
become apparent. This research has not addressed these questi ons but, we
hope, future research will.
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